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PENNSYLVANIA COMMENTS ON CURRENT ESTATE
TAX PROBLEMS IN QUALIFYING PROPERTY
FOR THE MARITAL DEDUCTION
By J. BROOKE AKER*
INTRODUCTION
PROBABLY the most important single section of the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code to the estate planner and to the attorney who settles the estate is
section 2056-the marital deduction provision. Since its enactment into the
estate tax law in the Revenue Act of 1948, much has been written about it,
and it has been before the courts a number of times in many different forms.
The purpose of this article is to summarize some of the current problems
that arise in qualifying property for the marital deduction. With this limita-
tion in mind, three of the current problems in this area of the law are not
herein dealt with because they are concerned with the extent to which qual-
ified property interests will be allowed as a marital deduction rather than
how to qualify the property. These are: (1) the effect on a formula type
marital deduction provision of an election by the personal representative under
Internal Revenue Code 642 (g), to take administration expenses against estate
income on Form 1041 rather than on the estate tax return Form 706; '
(2) whether or not the amount allowed as a marital deduction will be reduced
by federal and state death taxes;2 and (3) whether the type of marital de-
duction clause used causes the estate to realize capital gain when the assets
distributed in kind, in satisfaction of the marital bequest, have appreciated in
value between the date of death and the date of distribution.'
The discussion which follows, since it deals only with property which
qualifies, is applicable regardless of which type of marital deduction clause
is involved.
* A.B., 1949, Bowdoin College; LL.B., 1952, Harvard Law School. Member of th& Mont-
gomery County and Pennsylvania Bar Associations. Co-Editor of the Fiduciary Review and Fiduciary
Reporter.
'REV. RUL. 643, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 386; REv. RUL. 225, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 460; Bell
Estate, 7 Fid. Rep. 1 (1956-Chester Co.).
2 Merchants National Bank and Trust Co. of Indianapolis v. United States, 246 F.2d 410 (7th
Cir. 1957); petition for cert. filed, 26 U.S.L. Week 3098 (U.S. Sept. 18, 1957) (No. 479); Estate
of Babcock v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 837 (3rd Cir. 1956), reversing 23 T.C. 888 (1944);
Weyenberg v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Wisc. 1955); Estate of Charles Juster, 25 T.C.
669 (1955); Estate of Rosalie C. Morrison, 24 T.C. 965 (1955); see also ESTATE TAX APPOR-
TIONMENT ACT OF 1951, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 §§ 881-887 (1951).
3 REV. RUL. 56-270, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 325.
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For lack of any logical pattern, the items are simply listed seriatim, and
where applicable or feasible, brief comments are included on the probable
disposition of these same problems had they arisen in Pennsylvania. It is
believed that such Pennsylvania annotations are of benefit because most of
what is written on the marital deduction is prepared for nation-wide reading
without emphasis on the variety of results which might obtain when the de-
cision rests on the status of local law.
MUTUAL WILLS
What effect does the execution by husband and wife of joint or mutual
wills which make provisions for others at the death of the survivor have on
the right to the marital deduction? '
There seems to be no question but that if there is an agreement, either
in the will itself or underlying it, which the state court will enforce with re-
spect to the surviving spouse, then as to property owned individually by the
spouse first to die, the marital deduction will not be allowed. This is so be-
cause all rights of the surviving spouse terminate at his death, the property
then passing to other persons under the terms of the enforceable agreement,
and because such restrictions were imposed by the decedent on his own prop-
erty.5
The litigation in this area concerns itself with property owned jointly by
the spouses. The leading cases are Estate of Emmet Awtry v. Commissioner,'
and Estate of Gust M. Peterson.' In these cases the Tax Court held that the
instrument in question evidenced an intent by the parties to include jointly
held property, and since under the applicable state laws of Iowa and Nebraska
the agreement would be enforceable against the survivor, no marital deduc-
tion was allowed.
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, both decisions were reversed-the
Peterson case by stipulation of counsel in reliance on the Awtry Estate. The
Awtry case involved a double test: (1) by Iowa law the survivor obtained
title to the joint property by virtue of the deeds and contracts creating the
joint tenancies, without regard to the all-inclusiveness of the testamentary
agreement; and (2) the restrictions existing with respect to the joint property
were voluntarily imposed by the survivor in entering into the agreement. The
4 See Jan. 1955 FIDUCIARY REVIEW 3 (definition of joint and mutual wills).
5 Estate of Charles Elson, 28 T.C. 48 (1957).
6 221 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1955), reversing 22 T.C. 91 (1954).
7 Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1955), reversing per curiam
23 T.C. 1020 (1955).
8 See notes 6 and 7 supra.
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court thus allowed the marital deduction even though under state law, the
contract would be enforced and the surviving spouse's rights would terminate
at her death. The court had this to say:
"There is nothing . . . which requires us to hold that a restriction vol-
untarily placed by a beneficiary upon her own property turns an absolute interest
into a terminable one."
"We conclude that Mrs. Awtry acquired title to the joint tenancy property
through the joint tenancy contracts, that the will as a testamentary instrument
in no way affects the title to the joint tenancy property, and that the joint ten-
ancy property did not by reason of anything done by Mr. Awtry pass to others
than his surviving spouse." 9
The Court's -olicitous attitude toward restrictions, self-imposed by the
survivor, is not always followed in other areas of the marital deduction prob-
lem. 0
The court in Awtry v. Commissioner posted one warning flag. "The
contractual restrictions now relied upon by the Commissioner were not im-
posed by Mr. Awtry in connection with the creation of the various joint ten-
ancies. If the contract now relied on was part of the consideration for the
joint tenancies, there would be more merit in the Commissioner's present
position." "
However, the mere fact that property is placed in joint names after the
execution of the joint or mutual wills does not, of itself, disqualify that prop-
erty. At least it would so seem since the Peterson case involved such property,
about which the lower court made specific mention, and the government made
no comment in agreeing that the case be reversed in light of Awtry v. Com-
missioner.
Pennsylvania Comment: The same result would obtain in Pennsylvania,
since title to any jointly held property would pass to the survivor irrespective
of the testamentary contract, even if the contract will be enforced as to such
property. The result may even be somewhat easier to reach because in Penn-
sylvania the execution of a joint or mutual will, without more, will not of
itself be construed as creating an enforceable contract and the survivor is-
free to dispose of the property as he wishes.'"
9 221 F.2d at 760.
10 Compare the cases cited under "Spouse's Compromise", infra, particularly Estate of Webb
27 T.C. 76 (1957).
11 221 F.2d at 759.




Life insurance proceeds may be made payable to the surviving spouse in
a variety of ways which will qualify for the marital deduction. Proceeds
payable in a lump sum, or retained by the insurance company with either
interest on the proceeds or stated installments payable to the widow for life,
with the principal remaining at her death payable to her estate, will qualify.1"
This is apparently true even though the surviving spouse must comply with
certain procedural formalities, such as submitting proofs of death, before she
obtains the first payment.14
The other large category of payment options which qualify is the re-
tention of proceeds by the insurer with at least annual installment or interest
payments to the surviving spouse with a power of appointment over the pro-
ceeds remaining at her death. For this type of option to qualify, the option
must meet all five of the conditions specified in Internal Revenue Code sec-
tion 2056(b) (6).15
If only a portion of the proceeds meet the stated requirements, the de-
duction will be limited to that portion, and if varying portions of the proceeds
qualify under some requirements but not all, then the deduction will be lim-
ited to the smallest portion.16
However, it must be noted that these proposed regulations are subject to
change before they become final and the language above referred to is broader
than need be under the statute. Under the statutory language some writers
have evidenced concern as to whether or not the specific portions must be
identical.1"
When the proceeds were retained with payments to the widow for ten
years certain and thereafter for life, but if the widow died before ten years,
the balance of the period certain payments went to contingent beneficiaries,
one court has held that the value of the life estate qualified for the marital
deduction since, although it was a terminable interest, no part of that interest
would ever inure to anyone else.1" The value of the period certain payments
was held not to qualify because third persons might benefit by that terminable
18 Tent. Treas. Reg. 20.2056(e)-2(a)(3).
141d. 20.2056(b)-6(d); INT. REV. CODE OF 1939 §81.47a(d).
15 Tent. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056('b)-6(a); INT. REV. CODE OF 1939 § 81.47a(d).
16 Id. § 20.2056(b).6(b).
17 See 11 J. Am. Soc'y. C. L. U. 91 (Winter 1956).




interest. This would hold true even though the widow had a life expectancy
of more than ten years.19
Various problems arise as to what constitutes a qualifying power of ap-
pointment.2" The power to appoint must exist after decedent's death; power
to alter beneficiaries only prior to decedent's death, which power was never
exercised and which ceased on decedent's death, was held not sufficient. 1 Con-
versely, the power of appointment must exist immediately at decedent's death.
This requirement is frequently violated by the insertion of a provision that
the wife's rights are contingent upon filing proofs of death or some similar
procedural matter. Thus, in Eggleston v. Dudley 22 insurance proceeds were
held not to qualify for the marital deduction when the proceeds were payable
to the surviving wife or her estate unless she died prior to the time the com-
pany received proof of death, in which event the proceeds were payable to
the decedent's estate. The proposed regulations attempt to draw the line in
this manner."
"If the power is exercisable from the moment of the decedent's death, the
contract is not disqualified merely because the insurer may require proof of
the decedent's death as a condition of making payment to the appointee. If
the submission of proof of the decedent's death is a condition to the exercise
of the power, the power will not be considered 'exercisable in all events' unless
in the event the surviving spouse had died immediately following the decedent,
her power to appoint would have been considered to exist at the time of her
death, within the meaning of section 2041 (a) (2)." 24
If the interest of the surviving spouse in the proceeds is established by
a state court as the result of an adversary proceeding, whether or not appealed
to the highest state court, that determination will control the tax determina-
tion.25
If the proceeds are payable to the widow under a payment plan which
does not qualify, but under the terms of the insurance policy the widow has
the option to elect another mode of payment which will qualify, is the dece-
dent's estate entitled to a marital deduction for such proceeds? The answer
19 REV. RUL. 55-733, 1955-2 CUM. BULL. 388.
20 REV. RUL. 55-277, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 456 stated that a power in a widow to direct payment
"to her executors, administrators, or assigns" qualified as the equivalent to the statutory power of
appointment.
21 Estate of White v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 641 (1954).
22 154 F. Supp. 178 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
2 3 Tent. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b).6(e) (2).24 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939 § 81.47a(d).
25 Estate of Wynekoop v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 167 (1955); cf. Eggleston v. Dudley 154 F.
Supp. 178 (W.D. Pa. 1957), where the court said, "There must be a uniform interpretation of the
tax laws of the United States, and the laws of the local jurisdiction cannot control the interpreta-
tion of a Federal'Act."
1958.]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
is clearly yes, at least if the option is so exercised. With respect to a power
not so exercised, the following sentence is quoted from the Senate Committee
Report on the 1948 amendment to Section 812(e) of the 1939 Code: "It is
also immaterial whether any such mode of payment is determined by an op-
tion exercised by the decedent or exercised by the surviving spouse." (Emph-
asis supplied.) It is suggested that the allowance of the deduction would be
proper regardless of whether the widow exercised the option since the dece-
dent gave her property including the power to acquire such property for her
own use and the existence of such right makes the proceeds taxable in her
estate under Internal Revenue Code section 2041.2"
If it has been determined that the proceeds qualify for the marital de-
duction, an additional problem may arise as to valuing how much qualifies
when the policy was pledged by the decedent as collateral security for a debt
of the decedent still outstanding at his death. This involves a problem of de-
termining the primary source of payment of the debt (the insurance proceeds
or the general estate) .2T The mechanics of the computation are illustrated
by Estate of Coffin v. Commissioner 28 where the court stated that "the proper
way to value the one-third interest is to apply against it a pro-rata amount of
the indebtedness for which the policy was assigned as security."
Pennsylvania Comment: In Pennsylvania, the surviving spouse's rights
in life insurance proceeds are limited to the terms of the contract. 2' For this
reason, the expansion of those rights by application to the court, as was done
in Wynekoop v. Commissioner referred to above, is not likely. Therefore,
the result in Pennsylvania will be the same as in the cases cited.1
FAMILY EXEMPTION
Under section 211 of the Fiduciaries Act of 1949 the surviving spouse
may "retain or claim," as a family exemption, real or personal property "to
the value of seven hundred and fifty dollars." When the exemption is re-
tained or claimed, does that property qualify for the marital deduction?
The marital deduction, as provided in Internal Revenue Code section
2056(a) is limited to ". . . an amount equal to the value of any interest in
28 Cf., however, Estate of Shedd v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 41 (1954), affirmed 237 F.2d 345
(9th Cir. 1956) (discussed below under "Provision for Takers in Default of Exercise of Powers of
Appointment"), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 596 (1957).
2? Estate of Gwinn v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 31 (1955).
28 Section 54338 P-H Memo T.C. (1954).
2
9 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 301.11(a), PA. ESTATES ACT OF 1947 § 11(a).
80 See note 25 supra.
81 For Pennsylvania authorities on valuing policies pledged as collateral security see February
1955, FIDUCIARY REVIEW; Biron Estate 4 D. & C. 2d 729, 6 Fiduc. Rep. 46 (1955); Yoskin Estate
71 Montg. 259, 5 Fiduc. Rep. 120 (1955).
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property which passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse
.... The key words in this phrase are "passes" and "passed," and Internal
Revenue Code section 2056(e) contains a special definition of "passing."
Thus, although there might be some conceptual question as to whether an
intestate interest "passes" from the decedent, section 2056(e) (2) specifically
defines such an interest as one of those to be considered as passing from the
decedent. A similar question might arise as to whether a spouse's elective
share "passes" from the decedent, but here again specific provision is made
in section 2056(e) (3).
The language of Internal Revenue Code section 2056(e) is identical with
that of section 812(e) (3) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code as amended.
Subsection (e) was added to section 812 by the Revenue Act of 1948, and
concerning the addition the Senate Committee Report stated:
"Neither the payments made in satisfaction of such a claim or debt nor the
amounts expended in accordance with the local law for support of such surviv-
ing spouse during the settlement of the estate pass to such surviving spouse
from the decedent within the meaning of section 812 (e) (3)."
This prohibition was not of importance, however, since under sec-
tion 812(b) (5) there was a specific provision allowing deduction for such
amounts in their own right. However, in 1950 this deduction was removed
for the estates of decedents dying after September 23, 1950. In deleting that
deduction, the House Ways and Means Committee Report on the Revenue
Act of 1950 suggested that such support payments "will be allowable as a
marital deduction subject to the conditions and limitations of section 812(e)."
In 1953 the "bible" concerning this problem was issued. Revenue Rul-
ing 83, 1953-1 Cumulative Bulletin 395 stated that in order for an allowance
for support during the settlement of the deceased spouse's estate to qualify
for the marital deduction, the allowance "must constitute a vested right of
property such as will survive, in the event of her death as of any moment or
time following decedent's death, as an asset of her estate."
Under this state of the law two cases arrived at apparently opposite con-
clusions. Estate of Rensenhouse,8" decided that amounts paid to a widow
under Michigan law for her maintenance during administration did not qualify
for the marital deduction because such payments did not fall into any of the
categories spelled out in section 812(e) (3) of the 1939 Code. This case is
on appeal to the Sixth Circuit. In King v. W/iseman,"3 the court concluded
82 27 T.C. 10 (1956).
33 147 F. Supp. 156 (D.C. Okla. 1956).
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"that under the Oklahoma statutes the allowance given to a widow when
approved and authorized by the Probate Court vests in the widow an absolute
indefeasible right to said allowance and that it should all be included in the
marital deduction."
The King case did not make clear whether the court could make such an
award after the surviving spouse died, so that the right to the allowance was
vested at death even without affirmatively claiming it, or whether the court
construed Revenue Ruling 83 as meaning "in the event of her death as of
any moment or time following award of the allowance." The Commissioner
has attempted to close the latter possibility in section 20.2056(e)-2(a) of the
proposed estate tax regulations, by inclusion of the following sentence:
"An allowance or award paid to a surviving spouse pursuant to local law for
her support during the administration of the decedent's estate constitutes a
property interest passing from the decedent to his surviving spouse if the execu-
tor or administrator of the surviving spouse's estate could under local law have
caused the allowance or award to be paid to her estate in the event of her death
immediately after the decedent's death."
Although the language of the 1939 and 1954 Codes is identical on this
point, this sentence is new in the proposed regulations. It was not in the
1939 regulations, but they were identical to the present regulations in all other
particulars.
In Pennsylvania it is quite clear that if the claim is not made personally
by the surviving spouse prior to her death, it may not be made by her per-
sonal representative. 4 Since "title does not vest until claim is made" it seems
clear that no deduction would be allowed under the proposed regulations but
would be deductible if the second possible rationale for the decision in King
v. Wiseman is proper. It is understood that the federal estate tax agents from
the office of the Director of Internal Revenue for the Philadelphia District
are not allowing the deduction for estates of Pennsylvania decedents.
Also in 1956, Revenue Ruling 56-26 " was issued which adds more com-
plication. It reaffirms Revenue Ruling 83, but points out that the interest is
not disqualified unless the property would pass to someone other than spouse
or spouse's estate. "For example, if the decedent died intestate and one-third
of his estate passed to his surviving spouse as absolute owner under the in-
testacy laws of the jurisdiction, then one-third of any amounts paid out of
the estate, pursuant to local law, for the support of such spouse, is a deduct-
ible interest since, to that extent, it in effect merely represents an advancement
34 Kornman Estate, 6 Fiduc. Rep. 666 (1956).
,5 Int. Rev. Bull. 1956-5, p. 10.
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from property which is already indefeasibly hers, and will pass to her, or to
her estate, in any event." This, of course, makes the deductibility of support
payments dependent on the fortuitous event as to whether the testamentary
share of the surviving spouse which qualifies for the marital deduction is con-
tained in the residuary clause or not. 6
SPOUSE'S COMPROMISE
When a spouse compromises a will contest, what effect does the compro-
mise have upon the right to a marital deduction?
It seems clear that any interest the surviving spouse assigns or surrenders
under the terms of the compromise will not qualify for the marital deduc-
tion. 7  Tebb Estate 38 was decided under Regulation 81.47a(g), but section
20.2056(e)-2(d) is almost identical, with only inconsequential changes in
this respect.
With respect to whether or not any property acquired by the spouse under
a compromise qualifies for the marital deduction, the regulations state that
the deduction will be allowed "only if the assignment or surrender was a bona
fide recognition of enforceable rights of the surviving spouse in the decedent's
estate." Although the regulations then go on to spell out what effect a court
decree has on determining whether the claim was bona fide, it is clear that
court action is not always necessary. In Barrett v. Commissioner,3 the sur-
viving husband's claim was settled out of court. In allowing the deduction,
the court said, with respect to the 1939 Regulations:
"A will contest can exist without full-blown legal proceedings and we have
no doubt that the executor in this case recognized the threat made on his sister's
will .... We find nothing in the statute or in logic that would deny similar
treatment to a settlement payment made in advance of the contest where there
is a sufficient basis for a reasonable belief that only such payment would avoid
a serious and substantial threat to the testamentary plan provided by the dece-
dent." 40
Two limitations are worthy of note: (1) In addition to the bona fides of
the claim, the interest received under the compromise must still meet all the re-
quirements to qualify for the deduction. Thus, in Klienman v. Commissioner,"'
36 C. generally, Estate of Nelson v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1956), affirming
24 T.C. 30 (1955); REv. RUL. 55-419, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 51.
3 Tent. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(d); INT. REV. CODE OF 1939 § 81.47a(g); Tebb Estate
v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 76 (1957).
88 See note 37 supra.
39 22 T.C. 606 (1954).
40Id. at 611.
4t 25 T.C. 1245 (1956).
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when the wife compromised her contest and agreed to receive fifty dollars per
week for life, the court denied the marital deduction, stating that "the widow's
interests under the will and under the agreement were both terminable and
no marital deduction is allowed for either." (2)The interest compromised
must, itself, have qualified for the deduction.42
Pennsylvania Comment: The same result would have been obtained in
Pennsylvania in all of the above-cited cases.
POWER TO INVADE
Is a power to invade principal sufficiently equivalent to a power to ap-
point or to absolute ownership to qualify the property subject to such a power
for the marital deduction?
There is no specific mention in the Internal Revenue Code itself of
power to invade as qualifying for the marital deduction. However, proposed
regulations section 20.2056(b)-5 describes what will qualify under the life
estate with power of appointment provision of the Code. Section 20.2056(b)-
5(a) (1)-(5) sets forth the requisite conditions, and subsection (e) states in
determining whether or not those conditions have been met, ". . regard is to
be had to the applicable provisions of the law of the jurisdiction under which
the interest passes...." This, of course, again indicates that identical gifts
in different states may produce varying results in the right to a marital deduc-
tion.
Section 20.2056(b)-5(g) of the proposed regulations states that no
power of appointment will qualify unless it falls within one of the enumerated
catgories. And subparagraph (g) (1) (i) sets forth the following category:
"A power so to appoint fully exercisable in her own 'favor at any time fol-
lowing the decedent's death (as, for example, an unlimited power to in-
vade) ; ...."
This is substantially identical with section 81.47a(13) (i) of the 1939
regulations. The 1954 proposed regulations go further, however, and include
section 20.2056(b)-5 (g) (3) which points out some of the restrictions on a
power to invade which will disqualify the right to the marital deduction:
"Likewise, if there are any restrictions, either by the terms of the instrument
or under applicable local law, on the exercise of a power to consume property
(whether or not held in trust) for the benefit of the spouse, the power is not
exercisable in all events. thus, if a power of invasion is exercisable only for
42REv. RUL. 279, 1953-2 CuM. BULL. 275. See successive stages of litigation in Crosley v.
United States, 148 F. Supp. 810 (N.D. Fla. 1956).
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the spouse's support, or only for her use, the power is not exercisable in all
events. In order for a power of invasion to be exercisable in all events, the
surviving spouse must have the unrestricted power exercisable at any time dur-
ing her life to use all or any part of the property subject to the power, and to
dispose of it in any manner, including the power to dispose of it by gift
(whether or not she has the power to dispose of it by will)."
The problems concerning powers of invasion thus seem to center around
these main qualifications: (1) whether the surviving spouse's right to invade
is "unlimited," (2) is exercisable "in all events," or (3) is only for her benefit.
An additional problem under the 1939 Code was the requirement that a trust
exist."' In Estate of Pipe v. Commissioner,4' the deduction was denied because
there was no trust. Since the 1954 Code now allows a legal life estate to
qualify, it will no longer be necessary to try to find an implied trust or that
the rights equal absolute ownership."5
The spouse's right to invade is not unlimited if it is restricted to some
standard imposed either by the testator or by applicable state law. The great-
est divergence of results in the cases on this point stem from the imposition of
restrictions by the applicable state law. Thus, if the testator gives the surviv-
ing spouse the broadest, most unlimited power to invade imaginable, the mari-
tal deduction may be denied on the basis that state law would limit the exer-
cise of the power to a reasonable, good faith, honest judgment exercise which
is not "unlimited." 4' Compare, however, Estate of Ellis v. Commissioner,7
and Miller v. Dowling,48 where similar broad powers were held to qualify.
Ellis' Estate was criticized in Pipe Estate "9 and is on appeal to the Third Cir-
cuit."o
The "unlimited right" must exist "in all events" from the moment of
decedent's death until the death of the surviving spouse. Thus, in Estate of
Tingley v. Commissioner,"' an unlimited power to invade which would cease
"in case of her legal incapacity from any cause or upon the appointment of a
guardian, conservator, or other custodian" was found not entitled to a marital
deduction because "conditions short of legal incapacity could bring about the
appointment of a guardian, conservator, or other custodian of the estate of the
43Estate of Melamid v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 966 (1954).
44241 F.2d 210 (2nd Cir. 1957), 23 T.C. 99 (1954).
45 Cf. Estates of Evilsizor v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 81 (1957), where the deduction was denied
because under state law a power to dispose of assets did not enlarge a legal estate to a fee.
46 Matteson v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Estates of Taruer v. Com-
missioner, 26 T.C. 490 (1956); Estate of Pipe v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 210 (2nd Cir. 1957).
47 26 T.C. 694 (1956).
48 56-2 U.S.T.C. 11.646 (1956).
49 See note 44 supra.
60 See generally REv. RuL. 55-395, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 458 and Estate of McGehee v. Com-
missioner, 28 T.C. 44 (1957).
51 223 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1955), afflrming 22 T.C. 402 (1954).
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widow and the decedent chose to cut off his wife's rights should any such event
occur." The court intimated, but did not hold, that if the forfeiture of the
right had been limited to legal incapacity the deduction would have been
granted."
In this connection, it should be noted that the last sentence of proposed
regulation section 20.2056(b)-5(g) (3) goes far beyond the 1939 regulations
and the cases when it says that an unlimited power to invade for use of the
wife alone is not enough and will not qualify for the marital deduction because
it is not "exercisable in all events" since the surviving spouse has no power to
give the property subject to the power to third persons.
Even though the power to invade is unlimited and is exercisable in all
events, invasion should be permitted only for the sole benefit of the surviving
spouse or at her sole direction."
When some assets qualify for the marital deduction and some do not, it
is important to segregate and identify those which do, or no deduction will be
allowed."
Pennsylvania Comment: The Pennsylvania view is expressed in Ellis' Estate
which involved a trust created by a Pennsylvania decedent. State law will not
impose restrictions on an otherwise unlimited power to invade so as to dis-
qualify the gift for the marital deduction.5
POWER OF APPOINTMENT OVER LESS THAN WHOLE
The denial of the deduction for a trust under the 1939 Code where the
right to income and power to appoint existed over less than the whole was
removed by the inclusion in section 2056(b) (5) of the 1954 Code of the words
"or a specific portion thereof." Under the present rules the "specific portion"
may vary for each of the five requirements listed in proposed regulation section
20.2056(b)-5(a), provided some portion meets all five requirements, and the
marital deduction will be available to the smallest such portion according to
proposed regulation section 20.2056(b)-5(b). As noted above, however,
these proposed regulations are subject to change before they are finally pro-
mulgated and the language above referred to is broader than need be under
the statute. Under the statutory language some writers have evidenced con-
cern as to whether or not the specific portions must be identical.2
52 Cf. REv. BULL. 55-395, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 458.
53 Estate of Wheeler v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 466 (1956).
54 Estate of Tingley v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1954), affirming 22 T.C. 402
(1954).
55 The cases to support this proposition are all summarized in HUNTER, ORPHANS' COURT
COMMONPLACE BOOK, "Powers of Disposal and Consumption."
56 See 11 J. AM. Soc'Y. C. L. U. 91 (Winter 1956).
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Note the definition of "specific portion" in proposed regulation section
20.2056(b)-5(c). To qualify, the interest must be established as a fraction
or percentage of the whole "so that such interest or share in the surviving
spouse reflects its proportionate share of the increment or decline in the whole
of the property interest to which the income rights and the power relate." If
the widow's rights are expressed in terms of a specific sum, then the regulations
indicate that the Commissioner will disallow the deduction "unless it is shown
that the effect of local law is to give the spouse rights which are identical to
those she would have acquired if the size of the share had been expressed in
terms of a definite fraction or percentage."
This new "portion theory" therefore would now allow the marital deduc-
tion in some cases where it was previously denied.57
These earlier cases are important, however, for two general principles they
establish: (1) the liberalization of the 1954 Code rules regarding marital
deductions will not be applied retroactively; and (2) the determination that
state law would expand the "specific sum" bequest into the equivalent of a
"specific portion" under that section of proposed regulation, section 20.2056
(b)-5(c), so as to qualify it for the marital deduction, must be the result of
a true adversary proceeding, and not merely a decree obtained by what amounts
to a consent decree for the purpose of maintaining the claim for marital
deduction. 5"
Pennsylvania Comment: Under the existing law, the application of state
law becomes important only in determining whether a gift to the wife of a
"specific sum" from a trust corpus would be construed as a gift of a "specific
portion" so as to qualify for the marital deduction.
There is no absolute answer to this problem in Pennsylvania. Since a
factor in each instance is the testator's intent, the result will vary depending
on the provable facts of any particular case. " Analogy may be drawn to those
5 Estate of Shedd v. Commissioner. 237 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1956), arfiming 23 T.C. 41
(1954); Estate of Sweet v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1956), affirming 24 T.C. 488
(1955); Estate of Hoffenberg v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1185 (1954); Estate of Warner v. Com-
missioner, 1 56,278 P-H Memo T.C. (Dec. 26, 1956); cf. Estate of Barry v. Commissioner
f 56,097 P-H Memo T.C. (April 27, 1956), where the separate trust theory was sustained.
5s Estate of Sweet v. Commissioner, supra note 57, where the marital deduction was denied
for failure to give the surviving spouse powers over the entire corpus, even though a state court
had previously held that there were two trusts created; cf. Krebs' Estate, 5 D. & C. 2d 769, 5
Fiduc. Rep. 658 (1955).
59 Henderson's Estate, 323 Pa. 305, 185 AtI. 819 (1936,); Klenke's Estate, 210 Pa. 575, 60
Atl. 167 (1904); Pittman's Estate, 182 Pa. 355, 38 At. 133 (1897); Crawford's Estate, 9 Dist.
Ct. 378 (1900); Gray Estate, 8 D. & C. 2d 593, 7 Fiduc. Rep. 302 (1957); Mitchell v. Clippen-
ger's Heirs. 7 Cumb. L. 1. 121. 7 Fiduc. Rep. 112 (1957); cf. Johnson Estate. 80 D. & C. 23.
3 Fiduc. Rep. 209 (1953) and McCwen Estate, 76 D & C. 52, 1 Fiduc. Rep, 299 (1951).
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cases where a legacy of specific stock is held to include additional shares issued
as stock split prior to death."
Although no one would base a prospective estate plan on the assumption
that a "proposed" estate tax regulation is not valid, if the practitioner finds it
necessary to argue with the Revenue Service on this point, it is suggested that
this section 20.2056(b)-5(c) of the regulations is not warranted by the statu-
tory language. The statute speaks in terms of a "portion" and these regula-
tions attempt to equate that word with "fractional or percentile share," which
is not necessarily true. "Portion" is not necessarily synonomous with "pro-
portion."
FORMAL LIMITATION ON MARITAL DEDUCTION TRUST
1. Survival for Specified Period
Husband and wife, in making plans for the testamentary transfer of prop-
erty to each other, often wish to provide for what has become known as the
possibility of "simultaneous death." This is prompted by a natural desire to
avoid passing property to a spouse who dies shortly thereafter, thus incurring
double death taxes and double administration expenses. This problem is nor-
mally solved by providing that the spouse must survive for a specified period
in order that she may take. What effect does such a provision have upon
whether or not the property so transferred qualifies for the marital deduction?
The 1954 Internal Revenue Code in section 2056(b) (3) provides the
criteria:
... an interest passing to the surviving spouse shall not be considered as
an interest which will terminate or fail on the death of such spouse if-
(A) such death will cause a termination or failure of such interest only if
it occurs within a period not exceeding 6 months after the decedent's death,
or only if it occurs as a result of a common disaster resulting in the death of
the decedent and the surviving spouse, or only if it occurs in the case of either
such event; and
(B) such termination or failure does not in fact occur."
To obviate the necessity of proving that the second spouse died "as a
result of a common disaster" and to guard against the possibility of the sur-
vivor dying shortly after the first to die but from entirely unrelated causes,
most draftsmen have come to rely on expressly conditioning the bequest to the
0°McFerren Estate, 365 Pa. 490, 76 A.2d 759 (1950); cf. Carlson Estate, 78 D. & C. 571
(1952). With respect'to whether or not a "specific sum" bequest would be the equivalent of a
"specific portion" of a trust when two or more specific sums in trust exhausted the estate, and




surviving spouse upon survival for some period of time up to but not exceed-
ing six months."
Some draftsmen have used other language, however, usually with the
adverse result of losing the right to the marital deduction. An example is
contained in Revenue Ruling 54-121, 1954-1 Cumulative Bulletin 196, which
ruled that a provision under which the widow was entitled to life insurance
proceeds only if she was alive when proofs of death were received by the insur-
ance company destroyed the right to the marital deduction.
The following is example four from the "proposed" estate tax regula-
tions section 20.2056(b)-3 (d):
"A decedent devised and bequeathed his residuary estate to his wife if she
was living on the date of distribution of his estate. The devise and bequest is
a nondeductible interest even though distribution took place within six months
after the decedent's death and the surviving spouse in fact survived the date
of distribution."
This example covers exactly the same problem that arose in the much
litigated case of Kasper v. Kellar." There testator bequeathed $100,000 to his
wife "if living at the time of the distribution of my etsate." The case arose
under the 1939 Internal Revenue Code section 812(e) (1) (D) which is iden-
tical to 1954 Internal Revenue Code section 2056(b)-(3) above quoted. The
regulations under the 1939 Code concerning this problem were almost identical
for the proposed regulations for the 1954 Code except that example four is
new.
In Kasper v. Kellar the District Court held for the estate, relying on the
fact that the estate assets were actually distributed within six months of the
decedent's death and the wife did so survive. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit the court said:
"As of the date of the decedent's death there was no certainty that within
the six-months' period the spouse's interest would become absolute inasmuch as
it was possible that distribution might not have been made within six months
of death." 63
The court, however, entered the following decree:
"On the basis of what has been said, the judgment is reversed and the cause
is remanded, for a determination, on the present record or otherwise, as the
court may deem appropriate, of whether, under the wills-and-property law of
South Dakota, the language used and the intention and the circumstances in-
61 Fiduciary Review, July 1955 and July 1941.
62217 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1954).
68 Id. at 747.
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volved would be regarded as having had the legal effect of vesting and mak-
ing undefeasible in the widow, as of the time of the testator's death, the prop-
erty devised and bequeathed to her." 66
Before a decision was reached on the remand, California Trust Co. v.
Riddell,6" and Street v. Commissioner,66 were both decided against the estate
on similar "survival" requirements, both relying on Kasper v. Kellar.
On February 28, 1956 the District Court for Western District of South
Dakota held on the remand in Kasper v. Kellar:
"It is my opinion that under the wills-and-property law of South Dakota,
the language used by Chambers Kellar in his will, and the intention and the
circumstances involved, would be regarded as having had the legal effect of
vesting and making undefeasible in the widow, as of the time of the testator's
death, the property devised and bequeathed to her." 67
The District Court thus again granted the estate the right to claim the marital
deduction.
On October 23, 1956, in reliance on this latest chapter in Kasper v.
Kellar, the District Court in Montana 68 ruled that, in the absence of proof
of collusion in a state court decree, under a will directing that the wife's rights
would fail if she were not living "at the time decree of distribution of my
estate is made hereunder," that the wife's rights would fail only if she pre-
deceased her husband, then the estate was entitled to a marital deduction.
As noted before the 1954 and 1939 Codes contain identical language on
this point. For this reason it is difficult to see how the Commissioner will
sustain example four above quoted in states following South Dakota and
Montana law, assuming the latest District Court decision stands.
In instances when the wife's individual estate is substantially smaller than
her husband's, it may be desirable to establish a presumption that she survive
any simultaneous death situation. This can be effected by a simple state-
ment: "if my wife and I die under circumstances which render the order of
our deaths uncertain, it shall be conclusively presumed that my wife survived
me." Such a presumption will be effective for purposes of the marital deduc-
tion 69 and is permissible in Pennsylvania which would otherwise presume that
each spouse survived the other.7"
64 ld. at 748.
65 136 F, Supp. 7 (S.D. Calif. 1955).
66 25 T.C. 673 (1955).
07 Kasper v. Kellar, 138 F. Supp. 738, 744 (W.D.N.D. 1956).
681 Steele v. United State, 146 F. Supp. 316 (D.C. Mont. 1956).
09 Tent. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(e).
'0 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 521.
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Pennsylvania Comment: Although the Circuit Court in the Kasper case 71
listed Pennsylvania as one of the states which would agree with South Dakota
in vesting the wife's rights at death, a review of Pennsylvania authorities
would seem to be in order.
In stating that Pennsylvania would reach the same result, the court in the
Kasper case relied on Wengerd's Estate " and Martin's Estate.73  Later cases
indicate that such is no longer the rule in Pennsylvania.
Wlraught Estate" held that a widow's interest in her husband's estate
conditioned on her survival until "settlement of my estate" did not vest until
actual distribution and the wife's death prior to distribution caused her interest
to lapse. The court limited Wengerd's Estate to its facts which involved un-
warranted delay by the personal representative in making settlement. The
court stated, ". . . but, as in Wengerd's Estate, any such attempt would cer-
tainly not be allowed by a court to defeat a legatee's rights." "
The same court that decided Martin's Estate,7" two years later decided
McElroy's Estate," holding that a wife's legacy to her husband conditioned
"should my husband be deceased before distribution is made," lapsed when
the husband died before receipt of the funds. The court said:
"In our opinion Wraught's Estate is to be construed as substituting the rule
of intent in place of the rule that a contingency depending upon settlement or
distribution of a legacy is always ineffectual. If the testator's intent, that the
vesting of the legacy be contingent upon the legatee's survival at the time desig-
nated, can be found, it must control in the absence of arbitrary delay." 78
It is thus apparent, in view of Kasper v. Kellar that Pennsylvania testators
who condition bequests or devises to a spouse upon survival until "distribution"
will lose the benefit of the marital deduction.
2. Power of Trustee to Allocate Receipts and
Expenses to Income or Principal
Proposed estate tax regulations section 20.2056(b)-5(f)(4) provide as
follows:
"Provisions granting administrative powers to the trustees will not have the
effect of disqualifying an interest passing in trust unless the grant of powers
71 217 F.2d at 747.
72 143 Pa. 615, 22 At. 869 (1891).
73 57 Montg. 304 (1941).
74 347 Pa. 165, 32 A.2d 8 (1943).
75 347 Pa. at 168.
76 See note 73 supra.
77 59 Montg. 304 (1943).
78Id. at 311. To the same effect are the more recent cases of Golling Estate, 5 Fiduc. Rep.
320 (1955) ("not living at the time of distribution of my estate"); Wieand Estate, 7 Fiduc. Rep.
200 (1956) ("living at the time of distribution"); and Tyson Estate, 7 Fiduc. Rep. 206 (1957)
("die before the division of my estate").
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evidences the intention to deprive the surviving spouse of the beneficial enjoy-
ment required by the statute. Such an intention will not be considered to exist
if the entire terms of the instrument are such that the local courts will impose
reasonable limitations upon the exercise of the powers. Among the powers
which if subject to reasonable limitations will not disqualify the interest pass-
ing in trust are the power to determine the charges which shall be made against
income and corpus, the power to apply the income or corpus for the benefit of
the spouse, and the power to retain the assets passing to the trust. 7
(Emphasis supplied.)
This section of the proposed regulations is substantially identical to 1939
regulation section 81.47a(c) (6) with the one important exception that the
new proposed regulations have omitted or deleted the words "the power to
allocate receipts between income and corpus," which words appeared in the
1939 regulations just preceding the reference to the power to determine the
allocation of charges.
Whether these words were omitted by mistake or were intentionally
deleted is not clear, but the result is that the only remaining guides for what
constitute permissible directions concerning allocation of receipts is proposed
regulation section 20.2056(b)-5(f)(3), which technically appears to refer
only to allocation rules stated in the instrument, and the general provision in
section 20.2056(b) -5 (f) that a trust which meets the income requirements will
qualify,
"... unless the terms of the trust and surrounding circumstances consid-
ered as a whole evidence an intention to deprive the spouse of the requisite
degree of enjoyment. In determining whether a trust evidences that inten-
tion, the treatment required or permitted with respect to individual items must
be considered in relation to the entire system provided for the administration
of the trust."
The result will probably be that despite the deleted language, power to
allocate items of receipt will not disqualify a trust provided, as is required with
respect to allocation of charges, that "the entire terms of the instrument are
such that the local courts will impose reasonable limitations upon the exercise
of the powers."
This is, of course, a problem of the settlor's intent and the result may vary
depending on the provable facts.
Pennsylvania Comment: Authority to grant the trustee power to allocate re-
ceipts and expenses to income or principal is specifically given to settlors by
section two of the Principal and Income Act of 1947. At least two reported
7 For permissible allocation rules to be spelled out in the will itself (rather than granting dis-
cretion to the trustee), see Tent. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f) (3), which is substantially identical
to 1939 regulation § 81.47a(c) (5).
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cases have held that on their facts the settlor granted the trustees an absolute
discretion free of the normal rules of apportionment."0 However, with respect
to certain other discretionary powers granted to a trustee, the courts have exer-
cised control to make certain that the exercise of such discretion was within
"reasonable judgment." "' Analogies might be drawn to those cases where the
court reviewed the trustee's exercise of a discretionary power to terminate,"
to pay principal for maintenance, " or to hold or apply income for mainte-
nance.
84
3. Power of Appointment May Be Exercised Only by a
Will Executed After Decedent's Death
This permissible limitation is granted in proposed estate tax regulations
section 20.2056(b) -5 (g) (4):
" . . if the power [of appointment) is in existence at all times following
the decedent's death, limitations of a formal nature will not disqualify an inter-
est .... Examples of formal limitations on a power exercisable by will are that
it must be exercised by a will executed by the surviving spouse after the dece-
dent's death .
This language is identical to that contained in the previous regulations, section
81.47a(c) (16).
4. Power of Appointment May Be Exercised Only by
Specific Reference Thereto
As in the foregoing limitation in paragraph 2, supra, proposed regula-
tions section 20.2056(b)-5(g)'(4) also give this example of a formal limita-
tion permissible on a power of appointment exercisable by will: ". . . that
exercise must be by specific reference to the power." This, too, is a repeat of
section 81.47a(c) (16) of the 1939 regulations.
5. Provision for Takers in Default of Exercise of
Power of Appointment
When the interest passing to the surviving spouse is a right to income for
life plus a power of appointment, what effect will a gift over in default of
appointment have on the right to the marital deduction?
80 Hood Trust, 7 Fiduc. Rep. 223 (1957); Sinkler Trust, 3 D. & C. 2d 241, 5 Fiduc. Rep.
337 (1954).
81 Forrish v. Kennedy, 377 Pa. 370, 105 A.2d 67 (1954); Baker Trust, 5 Fiduc. Rep. 431
(1955).
82 HUNTER, ORPHANS' COURT COMMONPLACE BOOK, "Trusts", § 10.
a Id. at § 11.
84 Id. at § 12.
1958.]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
It will have no effect. The gift over in default of appointment has always
been a permissible limitation on the power of appointment. It was expressly
permitted in a Letter Ruling issued April 19, 1948,5 was incorporated into
the 1939 Regulations section 81.47a(c) (14), and was repeated in Revenue
Ruling 55-394, 1955 Cumulative Bulletin 458.86
The permission is presently granted in proposed regulation section
20.2056(b)-5(g) (2) as follows:
"An interest passing in trust will not be regarded as failing to satisfy the
condition [in Internal Revenue Code section 2056(b) (5) that the surviving
spouse must have the power to appoint the entire interest or the specific por-
tion to either herself or her estate] merely because takers in default of the sur-
viving spouse's exercise of the power are designated by the decedent. The
decedent may provide that, in default of exercise of the power, the trust shall
continue for an additional period."
As pointed out in Estate of Shedd v. Commissioner, 7 however, the per-
missible use of takers in default of appointment is limited to cases where there
is a qualified power of appointment. In the Shedd case the power of appoint-
ment did not qualify, and although the surviving widow did exercise her power
and appointed to herself less than a year after her husband's death, such ap-
pointed property did not qualify because as of the moment of her husband's
death, the surviving spouse received no property which qualified, but only a
power to acquire such property if she exercised that power. Thus, assets
which pass to the surviving spouse only if that spouse exercises a power of
appointment to defeat the rights of designated takers, in default of appoint-
ment will not qualify for the marital deduction unless the power of appoint-
ment itself qualifies under the requirements of Internal Revenue Code section
2056(b) (5). This is illustrated by the following statement from proposed
regulations section 20.2056(b)-5(b):
"Further, if the surviving spouse has no right to income from a specific
portion of a property interest but a testamentary power of appointment which
meets the necessary conditions over the entire interest, then none of the interest
qualifies for the deduction."
6. Imposition of Spendthrift Provision
"An interest passing in trust will not fail to satisfy the condition ... that
the spouse be entitled to all the income merely because its terms provide that
the right of the surviving spouse to the income shall not be subject to assign-
ment, alienation, pledge, attachment or claims of creditors." 88
85 CCH Est. & Gift Tax Rep., 1 2070.70.
88 Id. at J 8034.
87237 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1956), a/firming 23 T.C. 41 (1954).
s8 Tent. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f) (7).
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This is substantially identical to section 81.47a(c) (10) of the 1939 regu-
lations.
Pennsylvania Comment: This is especially true in Pennsylvania where a
spendthrift trust may, under proper circumstances, be terminated.89
CONCLUSION
In reviewing these permissible limitations which may be imposed on a
marital deduction trust, two points should be kept in mind.
First, the enumeration in the proposed regulations of these various per-
missible limitations is handled on an individual basis. That is, each limitation
by itself is stated not to destroy the right to the marital deduction. But no-
where in the regulations does it state whether any combination, or even all,
of these limitations if imposed upon a marital deduction trust would be per-
missible or not. It is the familiar problem of whether or not the sum of sev-
eral zeros becomes one.
Second, it is the existence of, not the ability of the surviving spouse to
exercise a qualified power of appointment which is the determining factor.
Thus, the marital deduction is allowable for a trust providing for income to
wife for life with a general power of appointment, even though the wife never
could have exercised the power because she was totally incompetent "at all
times from the date of the creation of the trust to the date of her death." 90
1. Incompetent Spouse
When a taxpayer's spouse has been formally adjudicated an incompetent,
advantage may still be taken of the marital deduction by making the bequest
to the duly appointed guardian. Any property, which would qualify if be-
queathed or devised to the spouse, will still qualify if bequeathed or devised to
the guardian of a spouse who has been formally adjudicated an incompetent.9
2. Effect of Interlocutory Divorce
The decedent-husband's estate will be entitled to the marital deduction if
he dies before an interlocutory divorce decree becomes final, provided that
under the applicable state law the divorced mate retains the status of spouse. 2
89 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 301.2, ESTATES ACT OF 1947, § 2. See Timmins Trusts, 7 Fiduc.
Rep. 453 (1957); Keen Estate, 80 D. & C. 377, 1 Fiduc. Rep. 360 (1951); Goward Estate, I Fiduc.
Rep. 93 (1950); cf. Close Estate, 83 D. & C. 136, 3 Fiduc. Rep. 113 (1952); Rebmann Trust,
2 Fiduc. Rep. 288 (1952); and HUNTER, ORPHANS' COURT COMMONPLACE BOOK, "Trusts",
§§5(o) and 13(f).
90 REV. RUL. 55-518, 1955-2 CUM. BULL. 384.
O CCH Est. & Gift Tax Rep. 11 2070.30.
92 See dicta in Eccles v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1953), affirming 19 T.C. 1049.
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Pennsylvania Comment: This problem will not arise in Pennsylvania since
there is no provision for interlocutory divorce and under section 7(2) of the
Wills Act of 1947, immediately upon divorce "all provisions in the will in
favor or relating to his spouse so divorced shall thereby become ineffective for
all purposes."
3. Unproductive Property
The proposed regulations perpetuate two exceptions to the general require-
ment that in order for property to qualify for the marital deduction it must
be income producing property. Both are found in proposed estate tax regula-
tions section 20.2056(b)-5(f) (4) which is substantially identical to 1939 regu-
lations section 81.47a(c) (6).
The first deals with property in general:
"... a power to retain trust assets which consist substantially of unproduc-
tive property will not disqualify the interest if the applicable rules for the
administration of the trust require, or permit the spouse to require, that the
trustee either make the property productive or convert it within a reasonable
time ... "
The second deals with the retention of the home residence and other
personal effects of a sentimental value:
Further, a power to retain a residence for the spouse or other prop-
erty for her personal use will not disqualify the interest passing in trust."
Pennsylvania Comment: With respect to the first exception, section four-
teen of the Fiduciaries Investment Act of 1949 would probably so qualify under
the above quoted language to protect the right to the marital deduction in
non-income producing property received in kind, in the absence of specific
authority to retain same. However, if the trustee is given specific authority to
retain such property, then under section eighteen of the Fiduciaries Investment
Act of 1949 the trustee would be protected and the surviving spouse could not
force a conversion. It is therefore generally advisable in setting up a marital
deduction trust to provide that the spouse may force conversion of non-qualify-
ing property.
4. Absence of Property to Pay Surviving Spouse
When the total of administration expenses, debts of decedent, and death
taxes is so large that the result is that nothing remains for distribution to the
surviving spouse, the marital deduction will be disallowed. 3 Although the
facts are not clear, this apparently would mean that if the marital deduction
93 Estate of Hohensee v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1258 (1956); Estate of Wheeler v. Commis-
sioner, 26 T.C. 466 (1956).
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were allowed and the surviving spouse would receive nothing, then the govern-
ment asserts its priority status as against other creditors and distributees and
claims the full amount of the tax after disallowing the marital deduction.
Pennsylvania Comment: See section 751 of Fiduciaries Act of 1949 for the
order of abatement, which demonstrates the vulnerable position of the widow
when she receives her share solely from the residue. "
94 For a discussion of the priority of the federal government for unpaid taxes see FIDUCIARY
REVIEW, JUNE 1955.

